巴菲特致股东的信（2014年）附录二：伯克希尔50周年过去现在和未来 ①缘起

In the Beginning

缘起

On May 6, 1964, Berkshire Hathaway, then run by a man named Seabury Stanton, sent a letter to its shareholders offering to buy 225,000 shares of its stock for $11.375 per share. I had expected the letter; I was surprised by the price.

1964 年5 月6 日，当时一个叫做西伯利·斯坦顿(SeaburyStanton)的人经营伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司，他向股东发了一封信，提出以11.375 元/股的价格回购22.5 万股股票。我本来期待着那封信，但却惊讶于这个价格。

Berkshire then had 1,583,680 shares outstanding. About 7% of these were owned by Buffett Partnership Ltd. (“BPL”), an investing entity that I managed and in which I had virtually all of my net worth. Shortly before the tender offer was mailed, Stanton had asked me at what price BPL would sell its holdings. I answered $11.50, and he said, “Fine, we have a deal.” Then came Berkshire’s letter, offering an eighth of a point less. I bristled at Stanton’s behavior and didn’t tender.

伯克希尔当时有1,583,680 股的流通股，其中大约7%的股份由巴菲特合伙公司持有(BPL)，这是一家由我管理的投资公司，我的所有净资产几乎都在这里。在那个投标书寄给我前不久，Stanton 问我，BPL 将以什么价格出售其所持股份。我回答说11.5 美元。他说："好吧，我们成交"。而后，在伯克希尔的来信件中，价格少了0.125 美元(即11.375)。我对Stanton 的行为感到愤怒，所以没有同意。

That was a monumentally stupid decision.

这是个极其愚蠢的决定。

Berkshire was then a northern textile manufacturer mired in a terrible business. The industry in which it operated was heading south, both metaphorically and physically. And Berkshire, for a variety of reasons, was unable to change course.

伯克希尔当时是一家陷入困境的北方的纺织品制造商。这个行业正在向南方转移，不论是隐喻的，还是实际上的。由于种种原因，伯克希尔无法做出相应改变。

That was true even though the industry’s problems had long been widely understood. Berkshire’s own Board minutes of July 29, 1954, laid out the grim facts: “The textile industry in New England started going out of business forty years ago. During the war years this trend was stopped. The trend must continue until supply and demand have been balanced.”

这是事实，尽管行业的问题早已被广泛地理解。伯克希尔在1954 年7 月29 日的董事会会议记录中，记录了惨淡的事实："新英格兰地区的纺织业在40 年前就开始倒闭。在战争期间，这个趋势暂时停止了。然而，这个趋势势必会持续到供需平衡为止。"

About a year after that board meeting, Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates and Hathaway Manufacturing – both with roots in the 19th Century – joined forces, taking the name we bear today. With its fourteen plants and 10,000 employees, the merged company became the giant of New England textiles. What the two managements viewed as a merger agreement, however, soon morphed into a suicide pact. During the seven years following the consolidation, Berkshire operated at an overall loss, and its net worth shrunk by 37%.

大约在那次董事会议后一年，两家成立于19 世纪的公司，伯克希尔精纺公司(Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates)和哈撒韦制造公司(Hathaway Manufacturing)合并在一起，改为我们现在用的名字。合并后的公司拥有14 个工厂和1 万名员工，成为新英格兰地区的纺织巨头。然而，两家公司管理层所认为的合并协议很快演变为自杀式契约。在合并后的七年间，伯克希尔的经营整体亏损，账面价值缩水37％。

Meanwhile, the company closed nine plants, sometimes using the liquidation proceeds to repurchase shares. And that pattern caught my attention.

与此同时，公司关闭了九个工厂，有时候会用清算所得去回购股票，这个模式引起了我的注意。

I purchased BPL’s first shares of Berkshire in December 1962, anticipating more closings and more repurchases. The stock was then selling for $7.50, a wide discount from per-share working capital of $10.25 and book value of $20.20. Buying the stock at that price was like picking up a discarded cigar butt that had one puff remaining in it. Though the stub might be ugly and soggy, the puff would be free. Once that momentary pleasure was enjoyed, however, no more could be expected.

1962 年12 月，我通过BPL 购买了第一批伯克希尔股票，我预计会有更多的关闭工厂和回购行为。当时股价是7.5 美元，相比于10.25 美元的运营资本和20.2 美元的账面价值有很大的折扣。在这个价格购买股票，就像是捡起别人抛弃的只剩一口的雪茄烟蒂。尽管烟蒂可能又脏又湿，但这口烟却是免费的。然而，一旦享受了这种短暂的愉悦，就再也没有什么值得期待的了。

Berkshire thereafter stuck to the script: It soon closed another two plants, and in that May 1964 move, set out to repurchase shares with the shutdown proceeds. The price that Stanton offered was 50% above the cost of our original purchases. There it was – my free puff, just waiting for me, after which I could look elsewhere for other discarded butts.

随后伯克希尔正如预想的那样：很快又关闭了另外2 家工厂，并在1964 年用清算所得回购股票。Stanton提出的报价比我们原始的买入成本高出50％。我免费吸烟蒂的机会正等着我，之后我就可以去别处继续寻找那些被抛弃的烟蒂。

Instead, irritated by Stanton’s chiseling, I ignored his offer and began to aggressively buy more Berkshire shares.

相反，由于恼火于Stanton 的欺骗，我无视了他的回购报价，并开始大举买入更多的股票。

By April 1965, BPL owned 392,633 shares (out of 1,017,547 then outstanding) and at an early-May board meeting we formally took control of the company. Through Seabury’s and my childish behavior – after all, what was an eighth of a point to either of us? – he lost his job, and I found myself with more than 25% of BPL’s capital invested in a terrible business about which I knew very little. I became the dog who caught the car.

到1965 年4 月，BPL 已拥有392,633 股(当时已发行1,017,547 股)，在5 月初的董事会上，我们正式地接管了公司。通过Seabury 和我的幼稚的行为(毕竟，0.125 美元，对于我或者他而言，算得了什么？)他丢掉了他的工作，而我发现自己把BPL 超过25％的资本投资在一项知之甚少的糟糕生意上。我变成了一只追逐汽车的狗。

Because of Berkshire’s operating losses and share repurchases, its net worth at the end of fiscal 1964 had fallen to $22 million from $55 million at the time of the 1955 merger. The full $22 million was required by the textile operation: The company had no excess cash and owed its bank $2.5 million. (Berkshire’s 1964 annual report is reproduced on pages 130-142.)

由于伯克希尔的经营亏损和股票回购，1964 财年末的净资产，已从1955 年合并时的5500 万美元降到了2200 万美元。2200 万美元全部都投在纺织业务上：公司没有多余的现金，并且欠银行250 万美元。

For a time I got lucky: Berkshire immediately enjoyed two years of good operating conditions. Better yet, its earnings in those years were free of income tax because it possessed a large loss carry-forward that had arisen from the disastrous results in earlier years.

有段时间我很幸运：伯克希尔很快就享受了两年良好的运营状况。更好的是，它在那几年的收益是不需要缴交所得税的，因为它前几年的灾难性运营结果，累积了大量的亏损结转。

Then the honeymoon ended. During the 18 years following 1966, we struggled unremittingly with the textile business, all to no avail. But stubbornness – stupidity? – has its limits. In 1985, I finally threw in the towel and closed the operation.

然后蜜月很快就结束了。在1966 年之后的18 年里，我们在纺织业里艰难挣扎，但却一无所获。但是固执(愚蠢？)是有限度的。1985 年，我终于认输了，结束了纺织业的运营。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Undeterred by my first mistake of committing much of BPL’s resources to a dying business, I quickly compounded the error. Indeed, my second blunder was far more serious than the first, eventually becoming the most costly in my career.

我第一个错误是将BPL 大部分资本投入到一个濒临倒闭的企业中，但这并未阻止我继续犯错，我快速地加剧了这个错误。事实上，我的第二个错误，要远远比第一个严重，最终成为我职业生涯中代价最高的一个。

Early in 1967, I had Berkshire pay $8.6 million to buy National Indemnity Company (“NICO”), a small but promising Omaha-based insurer. (A tiny sister company was also included in the deal.) Insurance was in my sweet spot: I understood and liked the industry.

1967 年初，我通过伯克希尔支付860 万美元收购了国民保险公司(NICO)，这是一家位于奥马哈的小型但有前途的保险公司(一个小的姐妹公司也包括在这笔交易中)。保险行业是我的最佳选择：我理解并喜欢这个行业。

Jack Ringwalt, the owner of NICO, was a long-time friend who wanted to sell to me – me, personally. In no way was his offer intended for Berkshire. So why did I purchase NICO for Berkshire rather than for BPL? I’ve had 48 years to think about that question, and I’ve yet to come up with a good answer. I simply made a colossal mistake.

NICO 的拥有者JackRingwalt，是我的老朋友，他想把公司卖给我个人。他提出的报价决不是给伯克希尔公司的。所以，为什么我为伯克希尔而不是BPL 收购了NICO 呢？我有48 年时间去思考这个问题，但我始终没想到好的答案。我只是犯了一个天大的错误。

If BPL had been the purchaser, my partners and I would have owned 100% of a fine business, destined to form the base for building the company Berkshire has become. Moreover, our growth would not have been impeded for nearly two decades by the unproductive funds imprisoned in the textile operation. Finally, our subsequent acquisitions would have been owned in their entirety by my partners and me rather than being 39%-owned by the legacy shareholders of Berkshire, to whom we had no obligation. Despite these facts staring me in the face, I opted to marry 100% of an excellent business (NICO) to a 61%-owned terrible business (Berkshire Hathaway), a decision that eventually diverted $100 billion or so from BPL partners to a collection of strangers.

如果BPL 是NICO 的收购方，我的合伙人和我将会100％拥有一个好生意，这注定会形成构造现今伯克希尔的基础。此外，在将近二十年时间里，我们的成长将不会受到纺织业中禁锢的非生产性资本的阻碍。最后，我们之后的并购将会由我的合伙人和我完全拥有，而不是还被伯克希尔遗留的股东拥有39%的股份，我们对他们没有义务。尽管这些事实摆在我面前，我还是选择将一家100％好生意(NICO)与一家我拥有61％股份的烂生意(BRK)合并在一起，这个决定最终将约1000 亿美元资本从BPL 合伙人那儿转移给了一大堆陌生人。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

One more confession and then I’ll go on to more pleasant topics: Can you believe that in 1975 I bought Waumbec Mills, another New England textile company? Of course, the purchase price was a “bargain” based on the assets we received and the projected synergies with Berkshire’s existing textile business. Nevertheless – surprise, surprise – Waumbec was a disaster, with the mill having to be closed down not many years later.

再来一次忏悔，而后我会进入到更让人开心的话题：你能相信我在1975 年又收购了另外一家新英格兰地区的纺织企业WaumbecMills 公司吗？当然，基于我们获得的资产，以及与伯克希尔现有的纺织业务的预期协同效应，这次收购的价格是个"便宜货"的价格。然而——意外地，意外地——Waumbec 是一场灾难，因为几年后工厂就不得不关闭了。

And now some good news: The northern textile industry is finally extinct. You need no longer panic if you hear that I’ve been spotted wandering around New England.

现在有一些好消息了：北方的纺织业终于灭绝了。如果又听到我在英格兰地区闲逛，你就不必再惊慌了。